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DENNIS LEVINE, AN EXCEPTION OR THE
NORM: INSIDE TRADING AND FOREIGN BANK
SECRECY
I.

INTRODUCTION

As national securities markets rapidly become international
markets, 1 the idealized precept that federal securities laws are to
create "a system providing equal access" to information for all investors, appears to faulter. 2 One cause of this breakdown is "insider trading." 3 Traditionally prosecuted under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,• illegal activities conducted through secret
bank accounts outside U.S. borders and jurisdiction have posed a
sobering challenge to prosecution of the inside trader. 5
Problems in prosecution arise due to concerns of extraterritoriality and the application of domestic laws to foreign conduct. 6
Foreign jurisdictions with bank secrecy laws may consider the disclosure of information concerning a bank account, including the
identity of its holder, a criminal offense. 7 This allows inside traders
1. Crime and Secrecy: The Use of Offshore Banks and Companies, 1983: Hearings
Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigation of the Senate Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 320 (1983) [hereinafter Senate Hearing] (statement of John M.
Fedders, Director, Division of Enforcement SEC); Note, Secrecy and Blocking Laws, 18
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 809, 810 (1985). "It soon will be possible to trade many securities of
U.S. corporations 24 hours a day as a result of improved international communications and
the growth of securities markets in London, Paris, Zurich, Singapore, Hong Kong, Tokyo
and other financial centers." Senate Hearing, supra, at 320.
2. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted that federal securities laws implemented
the Congressional purpose of creating a system providing "equal access" to information necessary for reasoned and intelligent investment decisions. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833, 851-52 (2d Cir. 1968).
3. "Insider trading" is a term generally used to describe the act of purchasing or selling
securities while in the possession of material non-public information (inside information)
concerning an issuer of securities. Arkin, Trading on Inside Information: Problems of Defining, Detecting, Prosecuting, and Defending Insider Trading Cases, 270 PRACT. L. INST. 17
(1984). The inside information must be "material" information, which is information that
would likely be "viewed by a reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total
mix' of information made available"; thus, important in deciding whether to buy, sell, or
hold a company's securities. Id. (citing TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,
449 (1976)).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982); Note, Bank Secrecy and Inside Trading, 23 Vrn. J. INT'L L.
605, 615 (1982-1983).
5. Note, supra note 4, at 605-06.
6. Note, Extraterritoriality: Current Policy of the United States, 12 SvR. J. INT'L L. &
COM. 493 (1986).
7. Note, supra note 4, at 605-06. A violation of banking secrecy is punishable under
Article 47 of the Swiss Federal Law Relating to Banks and Savings Institutions of Nov. 8,
1934, as amended by Federal Law of Mar. 11, 1971, and under the Swiss Penal Code,
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to circumvent U.S. securities laws by conducting their investment
transactions through these financial entities. 8 Foreign banks acting
as intermediaries for their customers, provide a means for an account holder to enter into anonymous sales and purchases of
stock. 9 The secrecy problem arises when the intermediary bank is
asked to disclose information about an account, which it cannot do
without being subject to liability under the secrecy laws of its
home jurisdiction. 10 Thus, neither the investor's identity nor information concerning the investments is available to the Securities
Exchange Commission(SEC). 11 Generally, the SEC's only means of
obtaining necessary information is through lengthy negotiations
and litigation. 12
As billions and billions of illegal dollars escape this country, 13
U.S. policy has centered around treaty confirmations with bank secrecy jurisdictions. 14 Much of this negotiation has been concentrated in Europe and the Caribbean Islands where extensive secrecy jurisdictions exist. 16 Treaties provide a mechanism to acquire
information, but at times prove cumbersome in ensuring quick
prosecution of the inside trader .16
In Part II, this Note will examine the Dennis Levine case 17 as
a recent example of an inside trader's exploitation of U.S. securities laws. Part III looks at the general problem of extraterritoriality and foreign bank secrecy. Part IV highlights the problem of
bank secrecy in Switzerland and the compromise ultimately
Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch [STGB] art. 273.
8. Note, supra note 1, at 812.
9. Note, supra note 4, at 606.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 320.
14. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding to Establish Mutually Acceptable Means
for Improving International Law Enforcement Cooperation in the Field of Insider Trading,
Aug. 31, 1982, United States-Switzerland, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 1 (1983) [hereinafter Memorandum]. Also, three years of negotiations with Cayman Islands resulted in the formulation
of a treaty. U.S. and Caymans Sign Crime Pact, N.Y. Times, July 4, 1986, at DlO, col. 2.
15. See DEP'T OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX HAVEN INFORMATION BOOK
(1982) [hereinafter TAX HAVEN INFORMATION BooK]. Some of the secrecy jurisdictions are:
Antigua, Austria, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, the Channel Islands, Gibraltar, Grenada, Hong
Kong, the Isle of Man, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Republic of Nauru,
the Netherlands, the Netherland Antilles, Panama, Singapore, S. Kitts, St. Vincent, Switzerland, and the Turks and Caicos Islands. Id. at ii.
16. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
17. See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
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achieved in that situation. Part V will look at attempted solutions
to the bank secrecy problem and recommend further possible actions to pierce secrecy jurisdictions. Part VI will conclude that the
SEC should adopt a pretrading disclosure system similar to that
presently used by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
II.

THE DENNIS LEVINE CASE

Recently, one of the largest inside trading cases ever was
brought by the SEC. 18 Dennis Levine, a former managing director
of Drexel Burnham Lambert, pleaded guilty to criminal charges of
tax evasion, securities fraud and perjury. 19 The SEC alleged that
Levine "illegally traded" in the securities of 54 companies between
June 1980 and December 1985. 20 Over the five and one-half year
period, Levine accumulated $12.6 million in illegal profits. 21
Dennis Levine represents the classic insider who employs the
use of foreign bank secrecy to hide his illegal profits. 22 Levine had
an elaborate scheme that involved fictitious names, phony Panamanian corporations, and a Bahamas based financial institution. 23
Far from the exception, the Levine case was one of 35 inside trading cases the SEC had under investigation as of July 1986. 24
A unique and pervasive factor in the bevine case was the cooperation of the Bahamian government. 25 The Bahamas has traditionally been a secrecy jurisdiction, but to aid in the investigation,
18. Drexel Official Accused by SEC of Inside Trades, Wall St. J., May 13, 1986, at 3,
col. 1. As was stated by SEC Enforcement Director Gary Lynch, "This is the largest insider
trading case we've ever brought, not only in terms of profits but also the number of securities involved and the length of time over which the violations occurred." Id. at 22, col. 1; see
infra note 28 and accompanying text.
19. Henry, Circus Time: Wall Street Reels Over Scandal, TIME, June 23, 1986, at 61;
see also Wall St. J., May 13, 1986, at 3, col. 1. Bernard Meier, a Swiss resident, who acted as
broker for Levine's trades from 1982 to 1985, was also named as defendant. Meier was a
portfolio manager and assistant vice president at Nassau based Bank Leu Internation Ltd.,
a subsidiary of the Swiss Bank Leu. Id. at 22, col. 1.
20. Id. In all 54 cases, Levine traded while possessing "material non-public information" about actual or proposed tender offers, mergers, leveraged buyouts and other business
combinations. Id. at 3, col. 1.
21. Henry, Dark Clouds Over Wall Street, TIME, May 26, 1986, at 48.
22. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
23. Henry, supra note 21, at 48. Levine conducted his trades through Bernard Meier,
an executive for the Bahamas subsidiary of Bank Leu, a Switzerland institution with headquarters in Zurich, Switzerland. Levine would purchase stocks in the name of two "dummy
corporations" set up in Panama, "International Gold Inc." and "Diamond Holdings S.A."
Id.
24. Henry, supra note 19, at 61.
25. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
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the Bahamian attorney general agreed not to prosecute the bank
for disclosing information. 26 Although there is not a U.S.-Bahamian treaty which would allow SEC access to bank records, cooperation was given in this situation where bank secrecy had been
used to promote fraud. 27
As of June 5, 1986, Levine was permanently enjoined from future violations of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.28 Pursuant to an order of the court, Levine is barred from association
with any broker, dealer, investment adviser, investment company,
or municipal securities dealer. 29 Levine was ordered to "disgorge"
all the money he had deposited in the Bahamas bank, approximately $10.6 million, and $1 million of additional assets. 30 Levine
also agreed to cooperate fully with the SEC's investigation of the
matter, and any other related litigation that arose. 31 Further sentencing of Levine is expected.
Evident in the Levine case, foreign bank secrecy could have a
stifling impact on the prosecution of inside traders. Important in
the disposition of that case was the cooperation of the Bahamian
Government. 32 Where such cooperation is not given, an alternative
is the extraterritorial application of U.S. securities law. This alternative, however, often proves difficult.
III.
A.

PROBLEM OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND FOREIGN BANK SECRECY

FOREIGN BANK SECRECY

According to SEC officials, incidents of securities law violations vary proportionally to the size and activity of the securities
market. 33 From 1978 to 1983, total foreign investment in the
26. Penn, Bahamas Official Suggests He May Waive Bank Secrecy Laws Again in Insider Cases, Wall St. J., May 28, 1986, at 12, col. 1. Paul Adderley, attorney general of the
Bahamas waived the bank secrecy laws in the Levine case.
27. Id. As was stated by Adderly, "you can't go to a bank in the Bahamas and try to
invoke bank secrecy to hide dishonesty, the [law] was never intended to do that." Id.
28. SEC v. Levine, (1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 92,761, at
93,703 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
29. Id. at 93,703-04.
30. Id. at 93,703.
31. Id.
32. See Penn, supra note 26, at 12, col. 1.
33. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STATISTICS ON SEC ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM: REP. TO THE
CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATION OF THE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COM. 3
(1985).
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United States had increased from $42.4 billion to $133.5 billion. 34
This increase in investment has led to increased complexity in enforcement and difficulty in conducting securities law violation
investigations. 36
Accompanying this rise in foreign investment, is a corresponding increase in the number of securities transactions initiated by
financial institutions located in countries with secrecy laws. 36 Bank
secrecy laws protect the confidentiality of information held by the
financial institution. 37 Banks operating within these countries are
subject to civil liability and criminal prosecutions if they turn their
records over to U.S. enforcement officials. 38 These laws protect the
bank customer's identity, business records, and other details relating to the customer's bank account. 39 There are approximately 20
nations that maintain some form of statutory bank secrecy, while
still more are based on common law and other rationales. 40
34. Id. at 44, app. 8.
35. Id.
36. Note, supra note 1, at 819. It has been estimated that 100 percent of foreign
purchases of stocks and bonds in U.S. markets in 1983 were conducted by institutions which
are protected by secrecy or blocking laws. Id. (citing Editorial, A Question of Conduct, Wall
St. J ., Nov. 19, 1984, at 32, col. 1).
37. Id.
38. U.S. and Caymans Sign Crime Pact, supra note 14, at DlO, col. 2; see infra note
40.
39. Note, supra note 1, at 819.
40. Id. at 821; see, e.g., Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 333, n.3:
The Bahamas Islands, An Act to Regulate Banking Business and Trust Companies
within the Colony. No. 64 of 1965, assented to October 28, 1965:
10. (1) Except for the purpose of the performance of his duties or the exercise of his
functions under this Act or when lawfully required to do so by any court of competent jurisdction within the Colony or under the provisions of any law of the Colony,
no person shall disclose any information relating to any application by any person
under the provisions of this Act or to the affairs of a licensee or of any customer of a
licensee which he has acquired in the performance of his duties or the exercise of
his functions under this Act.
(2) Every person who contravenes the provisions of subsection (1) of this section
shall be guilty of an offence against this act and shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding one thousand pounds or to a term of imprisonment not
exceeding one year or to both such fine and imprisonment;
The Cayman Islands, The Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law (Law 16 of
1976), September 27, 1976 as amended October 2, 1979:
4b. [Whoever] wilfully obtains or attempts to obtain confidential information to
which he is not entitled is guilty of an offense and liable on summary conviction to
a fine not exceeding $5,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years or
both.
Article 47(b) of the Swiss Banking Act:
1. Anyone who in his capacity as an officer or employee of a bank, or as an auditor
or his employee, or as a member of the banking commission or as an officer or em-
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Nations with secrecy laws generally view confidentiality as a
fundamental right. 41 Protections under bank secrecy laws have
been compared to the attorney-client privilege in the United
States, because "[b]oth restrict discovery of information in order
that principles perceived as more fundamental [might be] upheld. " 42 Despite strict adherence to underlying principles of secrecy, a secrecy jurisdiction will generally permit disclosure if a
customer waives his right to the confidentiality protections. 43 Extraterritorial problems arise when secrecy jurisdictions have different economic values and apply their own laws to the financial issues that arise."" As noted by top government officials, the United
States assessed need to reach persons transacting through foreign
nations often runs counter to foreign interests and principles of
sovereignty. 46
As a result of secrecy laws, the SEC has encountered serious
difficulties in obtaining information during investigations of cases
pertaining to inside trading. 46 The use of secrecy laws to hide violations of U.S. laws has created a de facto double standard for enforcement of securities regulations. 47 One standard exists for those
ployee of its bureau intentionally violates his duty to observe silence or his professional rule of secrecy or anyone who induces or attempts to induce a person to commit any such offense, shall be liable to a fine of up to 50,000 francs or imprisonment
for up to six months, or both.
2. If the offender acted with negligence, he shall be liable to a fine of up to 30,000
francs.
3. The violation of professional secrecy is also punishable after the termination of
the official or contractual relationship or ·of the professional performance.
4. The federal or cantonal dispositions on the obligation to testify or to provide an
authority with information remain reserved.
Additionally, Article 273 of the Swiss Penal Code prohibits the disclosure to a foreign authority or foreign private person of information of an economic nature if
there is a direct interest of Switzerland as a political or economic entity to keep this
information secret, or if third persons, having an interest worth being protected in
keeping the information secret, have not duly given in advance their consent to the
disclosure.
Id.

41. Id.
42. Note, supra note 1, at 821.
43. Id.
44. Note, supra note 6, at 497.
45. See Address by Secretary Schultz, before the South Carolina Bar Association, Columbia, South Carolina (May 5, 1984) (published in 84 DEP'T ST. BULL. 33 (1984)). In his
address, Schultz noted "our assessment of our need to reach persons or property abroad
often run up against other nations' conceptions of their sovereignty and interests and, if not
handled skillfully and sensitively, can escalate into legal and political disputes."
46. See, e.g., infra notes 95 & 116.
47. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 318 (statement of John M. Fedders).
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trading within the United States, and a lesser standard exists for
those trading within the United States but from beyond U.S. borders.48 If persons engaging in fraudulent activity had done so entirely within the United States, the SEC would be able to investigate and hold them accountable for violating domestic securities
laws. 49 A major goal of the SEC is to eradicate this de facto double
standard. 50 An ability to circumvent the protective nature of secrecy jurisdictions is the first step.
B.

EXTRATERRITORIALITY

Foreign bank secrecy statutes have long been regarded as a
serious hindrance to enforcement of U.S. securities laws. 51 At issue
is the sovereignty of the United States and the SEC's ability · to
preserve the integrity of the U.S. security markets. 52 Where secrecy
laws are used to infringe upon U.S. sovereignty, they effectively
invade the territory of the United States. 53 This basic problem becomes acute when attempting to prosecute the inside trader
through extraterritorial application of U.S. securities law.
Before a secrecy jurisdiction may be compelled to honor an
SEC request for information, some basis for jurisdiction must be
established. 54 Under international law, the jurisdiction of a state
depends upon its interests in exercising jurisdiction in light of the
competing interest of other states. 55 In examining competing interests, the state's interest is balanced against the transaction or
48. Id.
49. Under the Bank Secrecy Act, the SEC would possess information needed to prosecute fraudulent dealings. See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
50. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 318 (statement of John M. Fedders).
51. Id. at 320; see also H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1970 U.S.
CoDE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4394, 4397. "As note[d] by Congress in 1970: Secret foreign
bank accounts and secret foreign financial institutions have permitted a proliferation of
"white collar" crime ... [and] have allowed Americans and others to avoid the laws and
regulations concerning securities and exchanges .. .. The debilitating effects of the use of
these secret institutions on Americans and on the American economy are vast." Id.
52. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 321 (statement of John M. Fedders).
53. Id.
54. Note, Offshore Funds and Rule IOb-5: An International Law Approach to Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 8 FORDHAM INT'L L. J .
396, 401 (1985) [hereinafter Offshore Funds]; see also Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
and the Federal Money Laundering Offense, 22 STAN. J. INT'L L. 389, 398-406 (1986) [hereinafter Extraterritorial Jurisdiction]. International law recognizes three fundamental bases
of jurisdiction, those based on (1) territory, (2) nationality, (3) the effects doctrine. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 17 (1965)).
55. Offshore Funds, supra note 54, at 402.
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event in question, the person to be affected, 56 the state's interest in
protecting itself against actions executed outside its territory that
threaten its existence, and certain universally condemned activities. 57 In determining jurisdiction over these securities transactions, these factors are balanced with others in accordance with the
reasonableness of a given country's assertion of jurisdiction over
the matter. 58 Extraterritorial problems become especially apparent
when foreign secrecy jurisdictions subjectively consider their secrecy requirements more important than U.S. inside trading
prohibitions. 59 Without foreign consent to U.S. jurisdiction, circumvention of foreign secrecy laws is unlikely. 60
One country traditionally recognized for secrecy protections is
Switzerland. 61 In an attempt to limit problems of extraterritorial
application of U.S. securities law, the U.S. Government negotiated
various agreements with Switzerland which ultimately provided for
a mechanism to access information. 62 Examination of the Switzerland situation is illustrative of the general foreign bank secrecy
problem.
56. Id .
57. Id. at 404.
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403(2) (rev. tent. draft No. 1-3,
1980-1982). As stated in the Restatement:
Whether the exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable is judged by evaluating all relevant factors, including: (a) the extent to which the activity (i) takes place within the
regulating state, or (ii) has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the
regulating state; (b) the links, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the persons principally responsible for the activity
to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the law or regulation is
designed to protect; (c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance
of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such
activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally
accepted; (d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt
by the regulation in question; (e) the importance of regulation to the international
political, legal or economic system; (f) the extent to which such regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international system; (g) the extent to which another
state may have an interest in regulating the activity; (h) the likelihood of conflict
with regulation by other states.
Id .

59. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
60. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, supra note 54, at 404-10. Traditionally three types of
jurisdiction are distinguished: executive, judicial, and legislative. Executive and judicial jurisdictions both are sometimes referred to as "enforcement jurisdictions" this term generally
means the ability of a state under international law to enforce a rule of law. As a general
rule, a state may not exercise its enforcement jurisdiction in the territory of another state
without the permission or consent of the other state. Id.
61. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., Memorandum, supra note 14.
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THE SWISS EXAMPLE

Switzerland originally codified the secrecy requirement for
banking affairs in the Banking Law of 1934. 63 The Swiss action was
in response to Nazi persecution of German Jews and others who
held private assets in Swiss banks in violation of German law. 64
Swiss banks have traditionally played the financial intermediary
role for clients by acting as stockbroker, underwriters, and mutual
fund managers. 66 The Swiss bank has acted in these roles through
"omnibus accounts" registered in the name of the bank only. 66
Swiss bank secrecy has effectively concealed the identity of the
real party whose interest is put forth by the bank. 67
Several attempts were made by the U.S. enforcement and legal
bodies to pierce the Swiss secrecy wall. 68 These attempts finally
resulted in the United States and Swiss Memorandum of Understanding on Inside Trading. 69 The memorandum, although a milestone, by no means makes the acquisition of information easy.
There are several reviewing steps through which an information request by the United States Department of Justice or SEC must
pass. 70 Even if the request passes all the steps, the bank customer
is first notified and allowed to defend his position to the Swiss authorities. 71 If the Swiss authorities are satisfied that no inside trading has taken place, then no information passes to the U.S. author63. Federal Law Relating to Banks and Savings Institutions of Nov. 8, 1934, as
amended by Federal Law of Mar. 11, 1971. The law was intended to protect investors by
instituting various regulations on banking activities. See Note, supra note 4, at 608.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 611.
66. Id. at 612.
67. Id.; see Note, Secret Foreign Bank Accounts, 6 TEX. INT'L L. J. 107, 121-22 (1970).
These omnibus accounts are typically only identifiable by a number. Only a few top bank
officials can connect the numbered account with the name of the owner. When a person
receives a numbered account his signature either becomes his number written in long hand
or a false name assigned to him. As a further example of their intent to protect secrecy,
special carriers and "networks of semiclandestine agents" are used by some banks to deliver
correspondence, thus avoiding the attention a Swiss postage stamp might bring. Even when
the person deals personally with the bank his anonymity is frequently assured through the
use of secret entrances, and private soundproof conference rooms. Id.
68. See S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958); SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italians,
[1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 98,346, at 92,144 (S.D.N.Y. 1981);
Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1116 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 53115322 (1982)), 31 C.F.R. § 103 (1986); Treaty for Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters,
May 25, 1973, United States-Switzerland, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.l.A.S. No. 8302 (entered into
force Jan. 23, 1977) [hereinafter Swiss Treaty].
69. Memorandum, supra note 14.
70. Note, supra note 4, at 626-28.
71. Id. at 627.
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ities. 72 Only if the Swiss authorities are not satisfied with the
customer's explanation are records then turned over. 73
As cumbersome as the process seems,74 the memorandum gives
U.S. enforcement officials a means to prosecute inside traders. 76
Due to the U.S.-Switzerland agreement, inside traders have been
reluctant to use Swiss banks and have looked to other secrecy nations. 76 Agreements similar to that with Switzerland generally do
not exist with other secrecy havens. Consequently, U. S. enforcement authorities have, where necessary, used alternative methods
of obtaining disclosure.
V.

A.

TRADITIONAL METHODS OF OBTAINING
DISCLOSURE

EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES LAW

One of the first U.S. legislative efforts to combat the use of
foreign bank accounts was the Bank Secrecy Act(BSA) 77 passed by
Congress in 1970. The act applies only to American citizens and
those doing business in the United States. 78 The act requires banks
and other financial institutions79 to maintain extensive records 80
and file reports 81 with the Secretary of the Treasury concerning
certain domestic security transactions. 82 Failure to file the report,
filing of a false or misleading report, or wilful violation of the act
and its regulations can result in both civil and criminal penalties
for the violator. 83
Although the BSA has been helpful to some government enforcement agencies, 84 its use in hampering unlawful securities
72. Id. at 628.
73. Id.
74. See Note, supra note 4, at 626-28; see, e.g., infra note 95.
75. See supra note 74.
76. Note, supra note 4, at 623-24. Some countries with strict secrecy laws have been
overly eager to shield acccounts from foreign investigations. One example is the Bahamas,
which offered tighter secrecy after the Swiss eased their protections. As a result, Bahamian
financial institutions subsequently experienced great growth in their trustee business. Id.
77. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5322 (1982); see also 31 C.F.R. pt. 103 (1986); Note, Foreign
Bank Secrecy and the Evasion of United States Securities Laws, 9 INT'L L. & PoL. 417, 432
(1977).
78. Note, supra note 77, at 432.
79. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.ll(a)-(c),(e),(g)-(i) (1986).
80. See id. § 103.31-.37.
81. See id. § 103.21-.26.
82. See id. § 103.22(a).
83. See generally id. § 103.47-.49.
84. Note, supra note 77, at 435.
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transactions conducted through foreign financial institutions in secrecy jurisdictions has not been as fruitful. 85 Ineffectiveness results
from its character of voluntary disclosure of information. Effective
enforcement is possible only in jurisdictions where U.S. Government agencies have access to records. 86 Since U.S. officials are unable to obtain information in those nations where bank secrecy laws
are maintained, violations of the act are difficult to establish or
prosecute. 87
In addition to use of the BSA, U.S. authorities have sought
disclosure of information through extraterritorial application of
Rule lOb-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 193488 and Rule
37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP Rule 37).89 Rule
lOb-5, which was enacted to enable prosecution of fraudulent dealings in the U.S. securities exchange,90 is also applicable to foreign
banks who transact business in U.S. markets. 91 When information
concerning the transaction is requested pursuant to Rule lOb-5,
the foreign bank avoids compliance where the acts of disclosure
might subject them to criminal liability in their own country. 92 Unable to obtain the requested information, the SEC will seek a court
order compelling discovery under FRCP Rule 37. 93 Under such circumstances, a court must balance the interests at stake. 94 In SEC
v. Banca della Svizzera Italina (St. Joe's) 85 the Southern District
Court of New York applied such an approach:
In St. Joe's, prior to the announcement of a take-over bid for
St. Joe Minerals Corporation, there were various large transactions
in their common stock. 96 The Swiss bank involved in the transactions refused to provide needed information, and the SEC filed a
motion to compel production of the requested information. 97 The
85. Id.
86. Id. at 435-36.
87. Id. at 436.
88. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1986) (promulgated under the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1983)).
89. FED. R. C1v. P. 37.
90. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5.
91. See SEC v. Banca della Suizzera, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ii 98,346, at 92,144 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (St. Joe's) (where jurisdiction over the foreign
bank was based on its doing business in the United States).
92. Id.
93. See id; see also FED. R. C1v. P. 37.
94. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
95. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 98,346, at 92,144 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
96. Id.
97. Id.
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Federal District Court granted the SEC's motion and ordered the
bank to disclose the customers' identities or suffer substantial
sanctions. 98
Employing the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, 99 the
district court balanced the vital national interests at stake, the
hardship which would be imposed by the decision, and the good
faith of the parties. 100 The court concluded that "[i]t would be a
travesty of justice to permit a foreign company to invade American
markets, violate American laws ... withdraw profits and resist accountability for itself and its principals . . . by claiming their anonymity under foreign law." 101 With a balancing decision favoring
U.S. interests, 102 the bank obtained a waiver from its customer and
produced the requested information. 103 Unfortunately the success
of this action is not indicative of all such cases where courts are
often hesitant to apply only U.S. law. 104
B.

TREATIES OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE

In addition to the Swiss and U.S. Memorandum of Under98. Id. at 92,149.
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 40 (1965), provides:
Limitations on Exercise of Enforcement Jurisdiction,
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the
rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person,
each state is required by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating the
exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in the light of such factors as: (a) vital national interests of each of the states, (b) the extent and the nature of the hardship
that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose upon the person, (c) the extent
to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other state, (d)
the nationality of the persons, and (e) the extent to which enforcement by action of
either state can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
Id.

100. St. Joes, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 98,346, at 92,14849.
101. Id. at 92,149.
102. Id.
103. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 324 (statement of John M. Fedders).
104. See Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1971). The Supreme Court, in
reviewing the ability of the United States to gain jurisdiction in a trade dispute contrary to
a forum-selection clause (choosing the London Court of Justice as the forum for dispute
resolution) in the trade contract, stated:
The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if ...
we insist on a parochial concept that all dispute must be resolved under our laws
and in our courts .... We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and
international waters exclusively in our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in
our courts.
Id.
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standing, other negotiated solutions exist. 10 ~ Recently the United
States and Cayman Islands signed a mutual legal assistance treaty,
the result of three years of negotiations. 106 This is the first such
treaty signed with a Caribbean island, an area traditionally known
for its secrecy jurisdictions. 107 The treaty anticipates mutual assistance in the investigation and prosecution of acts that are criminal
offenses in both countries. 108 Despite advantages gained by both
countries, some have stated that the treaty was a result of coercive
fines imposed by the United States. 109 Similar treaties are currently in negotiation with other Caribbean islands 110 and are also
expected to be concluded.
The crimes covered under the Cayman Islands Treaty are extensive.m Not only viewed as a positive step in the Caribbean for
the United States, Cayman Islands officials also view this as a benefit.112 Under the terms of the agreement, United States and Cayman Islands officials will cooperate in providing bank, business and
government records; the taking of testimony and deposing of witnesses; searches and seizures of evidence; and the transferring of
individuals into custody. 113 In recognizing that criminal activity results in international repercussions, countries with bank secrecy
laws have been willing to cooperate where their best interests are
105. See infra note 106.
106. U.S. and Caymans Sign Crime Pact, supra note 14, at DlO, col. 2; see Treaty
Relating to Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, June, 1986, United States-United
(1986) [hereinafKingdom of Great Britain-Northern Ireland, reprinted i n _ I.L.M. _
ter Cayman Islands Treaty] . The treaty is to be ratified by early 1987. See also Pasztor &
Nazovio, U.S. Will Gain Access to Bank Records on Cayman Islands Under New Treaty,
Wall St. J., July 3, 1986, at 5.
107. See U.S. and Caymans Sign Crime Pact, supra note 14, at DlO, col 2; see, e.g.,
TAX HAVEN INFORMATION BooK, supra note 15. This list shows the relative number of Carribean Islands involved compared to other areas.
108. See supra note 106.
109. U.S. and Caymans Sign Crime Pact, supra note 14, at DlO, col. 2. The treaty was
signed after a U.S. court began imposing huge fines on the U.S. branches of banks whose
affiliate operations in the Cayman islands had refused to cooperate with U.S. investigators.
Id.
110. Id. Stephen S. Troth, head of the Justice Department Criminal Division, has indicated that similar agreements with Jamaica, and Turks and Caicos Islands, the Virgin Islands and Bahamas will be reached. Id.
111. Pasztor & Nazovio, supra note 106, at 5. A senior Justice Department official
stated "the crimes covered by the treaty are nearly all encompassing, and it will greatly help
prosecutors gather evidence in many more cases". Id.
112. Id. Peter Tomkins, president of the Cayman Islands Bankers Association stated,
"[t]his agreement may frighten some people away [from doing business in the islands], but
probably those are the people we want to frighten away." Id.
113. U.S. and Caymans Sign Crime Pact, supra note 14, at DlO, col. 2; see Cayman
Islands Treaty, supra note 106, art. I.
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also served. m Though a sign of cooperation, treaties often prove to
be an unwielding and frustrating means of prosecution for the
SEC. 116
A classic example of the inefficiency of using treaties as prosecution tools is the case of SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchaser
(Santa Fe ). 116 In Santa Fe, there were various transactions in the
common stock of the Santa Fe International Corporation, immediately prior to the public announcement of their merger with the
Kuwait Petroleum Corporation. 117 Various Swiss banks purchased
the securities on behalf of their undisclosed customers and subsequently refused to divulge their names. 118
The SEC request for information was first made in early 1982,
under the Treaty of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the United States and Switzerland. 119 The request was denied by the Swiss Federal Tribunal in early 1983. 120 The SEC continued to litigate the case, and based on additional information
again filed a request for assistance on July 27, 1983. 121 The request
was granted by the Swiss Tribunal on May 26, 1984,122 and the
SEC was given the names of the unknown purchasers. 123 The Tribunal's decision was then appealed to several political bodies with
jurisdiction over the matter, and the SEC was prevented from obtaining further documentary evidence with respect to the purchasers.124 Finally on February 20, 1985, almost three years after their
initial request, the SEC announced that the Swiss Federal Council
had cleared the way for their long sought after documents and testimony .125 This case illustrates the burdensome process that inhibits the SEC in its acquisition of necessary information through ne114. U.S. and Caymans Sign Crime Pact, supra note 14, at DlO, col. 2. Stephen S.
Troth, head of the Justice Department Criminal Division, stated, "[a]ll crime has taken on
an international dimension and I think these countries realize it is in their best interest to
discourage it within their borders". Id.
115. See infra notes 119-26 and accompanying text.
116. SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) ii 91,951, at 90,750 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (Santa Fe).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 90,751. The request was initially filed with the Swiss banks on March 22,
1982. Id.
119. Id.; see Swiss Treaty, supra note 68.
120. Santa Fe , [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 91,951, at
90,751. The request was denied on January 26, 1983.
121. Id. at 90,751.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. The Swiss Federal Council was the last body with jurisdiction over the matter.
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gotiated treaties.
Although methods of disclosure exist, they are often lengthy 126
and not uniformly applied. 127 Something must be done to overcome problems in obtaining disclosure. Cases like that of Dennis
Levine serve to destroy our "vital national interest in maintaining
the integrity of the securities markets." 128 Much more is at stake
than the $12.6 million hidden by Levine, 129 the entire future of the
securities exchange is at issue. 130
VI.
A.

A NEEDED UNIFORM APPROACH

FURTHER TREATIES OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE

One possible solution is continued negotiation of treaties with
secrecy jurisdictions. Treaties such as that recently executed with
the Cayman Islands, 131 allow for mutual assistance and a fairly effective route for U.S. authorities to gather information on inside
traders. 132 Foreign secrecy laws should not be given extraterritorial
effect to circumvent investigations of transactions that occur in the
United States. 133 Foreign nations should recognize that it is the account holder's choice to engage in conduct within the United
States and outside the jurisdiction of the secrecy country. 134 Secrecy jurisdictions and those who trade through them, must understand that the act of trading securities outside the territory of the
secrecy jurisdiction constitutes a waiver of any applicable secrecy
provisions. 136
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a defendant will be
found to have submitted to the jurisdiction of a state when the
defendant "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the foreign state, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws." 136 By conducting a securities transaction in
the United States, a foreign financial institution and its customers
126. See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 101, 104 and accompanying text.
128. See SEC v. Banca della Suizzera, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ~ 98,346, at 92,144 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (St. Joe's).
129. See supra note 21.
130. See infra notes 17 5, 178-79 and accompanying text.
131. See Cayman Islands Treaty, supra note 106.
132. See generally id.
133. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 322 (statement of John M. Fedders).
134. Id .
135. Id.
136. Id. at 321 (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 213-16 (1977); Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1957)).
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deliberately avail themselves of the privilege of conducting activities here, and "invoke the benefits and protection" of the U.S. securities markets and of U.S. law. 137 It seems they should also accept the responsibilities associated with the exercise of this
privilege. 138
The use of negotiated treaties appears consistent with the
principle of international comity. 139 It extends due respect to the
sovereignty and laws of nations with secrecy statutes, 140 but also
provides a basis for vindicating the sovereignty of the United
States and the integrity of its security markets. 141 The basic deterrent to a continuance of this approach is the sometimes cumbersome procedure encountered in obtaining information.
B.

CFTC

AND A PRETRADING DISCLOSURE SYSTEM

The best solution is a pretrading disclosure system, whereby
any foreign institution trading in the U.S. securities market must
agree to divulge requested information prior to trading. Failure to
comply with these preexecution provisions would result in the disallowance of further financing in U.S. markets. To best explain, it
is helpful to examine an analogous program presently employed by
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). 142
The CFTC conditions access to the U.S. futures markets upon
a willingness to provide information prior to trade execution, in
response to a specific request of the CFTC. 143 The rules require
that futures commission merchants provide the name, address and
certain information concerning the holder, or beneficial holder of
an open futures contract in response to such a special request and
on the account's first day of trading. 144 The CFTC's special call
provisions avoid many of the problems inherent in effective service
of process upon a resident of another country, such as a bank in a
secrecy jurisdiction. 145 Examining an attempted inside trader pros137. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 321 (statement of John M. Fedders); see supra
note 136.
138. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 321 (statement of John M. Fedders).
139. Id. at 322; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 242 (5th ed. 1972). Under the doctrine of comity, a state is asked to honor a judgment of a foreign country. Comity is not a
rule of law, but one of practical convenience and courtesy. Id.
140. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 322 (statement of John M. Fedders).
141. Id.
142. See infra notes 156-69 and accompanying text.
143. See infra notes 158-61, 167-68 and accompanying text.
144. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 17.0l(b)(1)(2)(4), 21.03(c)(l) (1986).
145. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 322 (statement of John M. Fedders).
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ecution would provide the best means of illustrating the benefits of
adopting a system similar to that utilized presently by the commodities futures exchange.
Utilizing methods presently available, 146 upon suspecting inside trading activity, the SEC would attempt to trace the source of
the transaction. If the trade were found to have been executed
through a foreign bank for an anonymous account, a requested disclosure of the account holder would likely occur. 147 Assuming the
customer refused to consent to the bank's disclosure, the bank
would not reveal the account's holder, pursuant to the jurisdiction's secrecy laws. 148 At this point, the SEC would make an attempt to exercise jurisdiction over the matter 149 and extraterritorially apply the requirements of U.S. securities law. 160 A probable
stalemate would result when U.S. law runs counter to the basis of
foreign secrecy laws. 161 Even if a treaty existed based on mutual
assistance, 162 expedience in the prosecution of the inside trader is
not likely. 163
If a system similar to that employed by the CFTC were
adopted by the SEC, necessary information would generally be
available to enforcement authorities at the time of the suspected
violation. 164 On the initial day of trading for any new account, the
bank in a secrecy jurisdiction, acting as a "foreign broker" 166 for an
anonymous account, must file a report with the SEC. 166 Before
trading could occur, the bank would have to inform the account
holder of specific requirements under any applicable provisions. 167
146. See, e.g., supra notes 14, 77, 88, 89 & 106.
147. See, e.g., SEC v. Banca della Suizzera, (1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) ~ 98,346, at 92,144 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (St . Joe's).
148. See U.S. and Caymans Sign Crime Pact, supra note 14, at DlO, col. 2. If the bank
makes an unauthorized disclosure, civil and criminal liability can attach. See also supra
note 40.
149. See generally supra note 54.
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., St. Joe's, (1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 98,346,
at 92,144. Prior to the SEC's request for an applicaiton of FRCP Rule 37, the SEC had
failed in their attempted application of Rule lOb-5.
152. See Memorandum, supra note 14, at 1; Cayman Islands Treaty, supra note 106.
153. See generally SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers, (1984-1985 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 91,951, at 90,750 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (Santa Fe).
154. See infra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
155. 17 C.F.R. § 15.00(a)(l) (1986) . "Foreign broker" means any person located outside
the United States or its territories who carries an account in commodity futures ... for any
other person. Id.
156. See id. § 15.0l(b).
157. See id. § 15.05(c).
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When reported for the first time, the foreign broker would provide
the name and address of the account holder,1 68 the number assigned to the account, 169 and the business or occupation of the account holder, 160 among other information. 161 The account for which
the bank was trading would have a "unique designator," 162 through
which the SEC could identify the account and maintain all the
necessary information. 163 Without the foreign broker's knowledge
of these requirements, it would be unlawful to enter into any
transactions. 164 Besides initial requirements, the bank would be required to submit a report of the daily activities, such as the quantities in each security traded, for each business day the account
traded. 166
If upon examining trading activity, a particular day's trading
appeared suspicious, the SEC could make a "special call" for further information on an account of a foreign broker. 166 The foreign
broker (bank) must then provide the SEC with the specified information.167 If the SEC was unsatisfied with the response, or the secrecy bank failed to respond at all, the Commission would be empowered to prohibit the execution of further trades for that
account. 168 If the foreign bank or account holder felt they were
treated unfairly, they would have the option of requesting a hear158. Id. § 17.0l(b)(l).
159. Id. § 17.0l(b)(2).
160. Id. § 17.0l(b)(4).
161. See generally id.
162. See infra note 163.
163. 17 C.F.R. § 17.0l(a). "For the purpose of reporting futures information ... each
... foreign broker shall assign a unique designator to each special account and shall report
such account only by such designator ... [T]he designator used shall be numeric ... [and]
shall not be changed or assigned to another account without prior approval of the Comission." Id.
164. Id. § 15.05(c). "It shall be unlawful for any futures commission merchant ... to
open a futures . . . account . . . or cause to be affected transaction . . . unless the futures
commission merchant . . . informs the foreign broker prior thereto, . . . the requirements of
this section." Id. § 21.03(b).
165. Id. § 17.00(a).
166. Id. § 21.03(c). "Upon a determination by the Commission that information concerning accounts may be relevant information in enabling the Commission to determine
whether the threat of a market manipulation, ... or other market disorder exists ... the
Commission may issue a call for information from a futures commission merchant or customer .... " Id.
167. Id. § 21.03(e). For information that may be specifically requested, see id. §
21.03( c)( l)(i)-( v).
168. Id. § 21.03(f). "If the Commission has reason to believe that a futures commission
merchant or customer has not responded as required to a call ... the Commission in writing
may ... prohibit the execution of ... trades on . .. the behalf of the futures commission
merchant or customer named in the call ... ."Id.
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ing at which point evidence could be offered to show the inappropriateness of the SEC's request. 169
Under a system similar to the CFTC's, the SEC would have
the information concerning an account in a secrecy jurisdiction on
the initial day of trading and on every day the account was active. 170 Before trading could occur, the account holder would be
notified of all requirements that would need to be met. 171 Upon
suspecting fraudulent activity, the SEC would possess a mechanism through which it could acquire further information. 172 If such
information was not obtained, the SEC could prevent further trading for that account. 173 Extraterritorial concerns would essentially
be eliminated. Any account which desired to trade in U.S. security
markets through a financial institution in a secrecy jurisdiction
would have to disclose its true beneficiary on the first day trading
occurred or forego trading at all. 174
Under the present system of SEC inside trading disclosure
and enforcement, the "integrity of the securities industry" is questionable.176 It was noted by the Chairman of the House Energy and
Commerce Committee that the securities industry was failing in its
duties as the "first line of defense" against securities fraud. 176
Something must be done to boost the integrity of the U.S. securities markets. No system or mechanism employed by the SEC has
yet proved effective in deterring the inside trader or in providing
for speedy detection and prosecution after any fraudulent activity.
A working system exists in the commodity futures market. The
SEC should adopt a similar system which would both provide
greater deterrence to the inside trader and easier access to information for the SEC. "Only (the SEC) can save (themselves)
177
•• "
If the integrity of the securities industry is lost, then the
169. Id. § 21.03(g).
170. See supra notes 158-61, 165 and accompanying text.
171. See 17 C.F.R. § 15.05(c).
172. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 158-61, 165 and accompanying text.
175. Dingell is Unable to Heap Any Praise on Securities Sector, Wall St. J., Mar. 6,
1987, at 3. The Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, Representative
John Dingell in addressing the Securities Industry Association stated, "[t]his is not a speech
in praise of the integrity of the securities industry, dismissing you to go off to cocktails ...
[t]hat speech would be the equivalent of a father turning the keys of his shiny new Porsche
over to a son who had over the last three weeks totalled the family wagon and RV, flunked
two courses and broken curfew every other night." Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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strength of the securities market faulters. 178 No one "want[s] to
preside over a repeat of 1929."179
VII.

CONCLUSION

Inside trading accounts for billions of dollars 180 of lost funds.
This problem is further augmented by the "insiders" use of financial institutions in bank secrecy jurisdictions. As apparent through
examining the Dennis Levine case and information on recent foreign investment in U.S. markets, this problem appears to be intensifying. Hampered by extraterritorial concerns, U.S. enforcement
authorities require a means to circumvent the secrecy barriers.
Attempts to break these barriers have been made and proved
successful but burdensome in Switzerland and the Cayman Islands. 181 Although many solutions have been proposed and tried, a
uniform approach to the evasion of domestic securities laws must
be formulated and adhered to universally. A pretrading disclosure
requirement system has been tried and proven in the commodities
future exchange. 182 SEC adoption of this approach could prove to
be the only way that fraudulent securities transactions can be
curtailed.

Stephen J. Psutka

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

See
Id.
See
See
See

id.
Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 320.
supra notes 14, 106 & 119-25 and accompanying text.
supra notes 155-69 and accompanying text.
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